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In the De anima 3.7 of Aristotle, the human intellect thinks the form or ei-
dos, and processes it conceptually, as an image, which must be imprinted in 
the imaginative faculty. In 3.4, the sensible object is related to sense percep-
tion as the form of the object is related to intellect, as the intelligible form, in 
relation to the sensible form, as it is imprinted in the imagination through 
sense perception. Thus the intellect is to what is intelligible as sense percep-
tion is to what is perceptible. The intellect is receptive of the form as an in-
telligible; it must think the form in order to perceive it, as an intelligible. As 
sensible form, the objects of sense are only fragmented and disconnected. It 
is only as the form perceived as an intelligible, or the form as thought by in-
tellect, that the form in the sensible world might make sense or participate in 
a congruent whole of experience.  
      In Aristotle’s De anima 3.5, knowledge is identical with its object: the 
object only exists because it is known, or thought, as an intelligible. The re-
lation between intellect and thought and thought and object is not accessible 
to discursive thought, or dianoia; an understanding of the relation requires 
nous, intuitive or unconscious thought as it were. In De anima 3.4, although 
the intellect receives a form as an imprint in sensation and becomes identical 
in thought with the form, the intellect is not affected or altered in any way by 
the form or the sense object connected with it. Sense perception is also not 
affected or altered by the sense objects which it perceives, but intellect is 
free of the affection and alteration to a higher degree than sense perception. 
As discursive reason or dianoia is connected to sense perception and the 
corporeal, it is also more subject to those shortcomings, while intellect or 
nous is not connected to sense perception or the corporeal, and is free from 
the limitations and affectations. 
      In De anima 3.5, Aristotle compared the “active” intellect to light, be-
cause light makes potential colors actual, as the active intellect might lead 
the potential, material intellect to actuality, or the sensible form to the intel-
ligible form, in the images presented by the imaginative faculty. The active 
intellect would thus lead dianoia to nous, the corporeal intellect to the incor-
poreal intellect. The potential, material intellect becomes actual when it can 
see the intelligible, because it is illuminated by the active intellect, in the 
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same way that light illuminates colors. The active intellect is seen as eternal 
and immutable, and is accessible to discursive reason only sporadically and 
ephemerally, depending on the extent to which the capacities of intellect are 
developed. 
      Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 198–209) is the earliest philosopher who 
saw the active intellect implied in Book III of the De anima of Aristotle as 
transcendent in relation to the material intellect. He connected the active in-
tellect with the incorporeal and eternal cause of the universe described by 
Aristotle in Book XII of the Metaphysics. In the commentary on the De ani-
ma of Aristotle by Alexander, intellect is seen as consisting of both a materi-
al and active element. The active intellect is seen as the cause of the 
“habitus” of the material intellect (Alexander, De anima, 88), its habit or ap-
pearance, form or perfection (85).1 Through the cause of active intellect, the 
material intellect develops from the potential intellect “through instruction 
and habituation,” to varying degrees, depending on the individual. The habi-
tus develops in the material intellect “from its activity in apprehending the 
universal and in separating forms from their matter,”2 in other words, from 
its dianoetic process of the exercising of abstraction and conceptualization, 
in combination with the extent to which it is illuminated by active intellect in 
order to see itself from outside itself in its mechanisms, that is, to have con-
sciousness, and to understand the extent to which its mechanisms are manip-
ulated and determined by the processes of perception in relation to intellect, 
and the unconscious processes of active intellect. The development of the 
habitus in material intellect requires the element of self-consciousness in 
thought. 
      The thought which is an object of thought is immaterial, or unconscious 
as it were, while the thought of which immaterial thought is an object is ma-
terial. In the same way, in the De intellectu of Alexander,3 the “enmattered 
forms that are potentially objects of thought” become objects of thought, 
immaterial, through intellect, as intellect separates them from their matter, as 
it separates itself from its matter, and in that way the enmattered forms be-
come actual just as thought becomes actual, because the enmattered form as 
object of thought is identical to thought itself: “intellect in actuality is noth-
ing other than the form that is thought of” (108), the intelligible form of the 
object, which is the object as immaterial object of thought. Knowledge, then, 
“in actuality is identical with the actual object of knowledge.”  
      The productive intellect is “called from without,” and “comes to exist in 
us from outside,” because it is immaterial, and because it is itself an object of 
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thought, as thinking “occurs through the reception of form,” intelligible 
form, in perception. Actualized thought is able to separate the sensible object 
as enmattered form and the idea of the object as intelligible form, as it sepa-
rates the mechanisms of discursive reason in material intellect from the role 
of the intelligible in perception. Because of this, there must be something at 
work in thought, in the activity of intellect, for which “what it is to be intel-
lect does not lie in its being thought by us,” that is, unconscious.  
      Material intellect, in discursive reason, does not think objects of thought; 
rather, it thinks objects of perception, which are only potentially objects of 
thought. The object of perception, the sensible form, becomes an object of 
thought, the intelligible form, “by the agency of the intellect” (110), produc-
tive intellect as an agency of active intellect. The activity of intellect is to 
“separate and abstract by its own power objects of perception that are such in 
actuality” from the sensible object which accompanies the object of percep-
tion, and to define the object of perception as such. The activity of intellect is 
caused by productive intellect, which makes potential intellect capable of be-
ing active, capable of thinking, capable of understanding forms in percep-
tion. Active intellect does not produce intellect of itself, but completes 
intellect which already exists. It enables potential intellect to develop and 
come to completion, without being affected, or “coming into existence 
through something else” (111). When potential intellect is developed and 
completed, it is capable of independently thinking objects of thought. 
      Because the intellect in habitus can apprehend the intelligible form in in-
dependent intellectual activity, and the intelligible form is identical to the act 
of the intellect in habitus, the intellect in habitus has the ability to “know it-
self” (Alexander, De anima 86), to be self-conscious. The apprehension of 
the intelligible form is the product of the cognitive act on the part of the ma-
terial intellect in habitus, and the apprehension is a result of the identity be-
tween the intellect itself and the object which it knows, the self-
consciousness, and not the actual knowledge of the object, which is only 
“per accidens.” Prior to the act of knowing on the part of the material intel-
lect in habitus, “the knowing faculty and the thing known stand apart,” sepa-
rate and unconnected. The individual is not conscious of the relationship 
between intellect and sensible objects as they are perceived; reality is struc-
tured in unconscious thought. When the habitus is actualized, the distinction 
between sensible object and the thought of it dissolves. The sensible object 
no longer has a relation to the intelligible thought, because they can be seen 
to be identical, as in a double lighting. The sensible object is no longer seen 
4 
 
as matter, but as eidos, incorporeal and intelligible. Sensation is only capable 
of perceiving objects as matter, as particular existents, thus sensation is not 
capable of sensing itself in the way that intellect is capable of knowing itself.  
      The active intellect is the productive intellect, according to Alexander, in 
contrast to the material intellect, or the material intellect in habitus, in a de-
velopmental state. In the De anima (3.5.430a14–15),4 Aristotle distinguished 
between the quality of mind which is “what it is by virtue of becoming all 
things,” and the quality “which is what it is by virtue of making all things,” 
the making of the actual from the potential. The productive intellect is inde-
pendent from matter, and is the cause of the existence of the sensible object 
as form or eidos. That which is most purely intelligible is the cause or pro-
ducer of all objects of knowledge. The production of an intelligible from a 
sensible object requires an unconscious, intelligible cause, which is prior to 
the sensible object. The productive intellect is impassible and unmixed; it 
has none of the qualities of material existence, of the relations between par-
ticulars. The productive intellect is impassible because the passive recipient 
of its action is substrate matter, that which is subject to change and affect. 
The productive intellect is thus incorruptible, not subject to the change and 
affect of which it is the cause. Singular sensible objects are cognized by pro-
ductive intellect in singular acts, not because of the relation between particu-
lars in productive intellect, but because of the role of discursive reason in 
material intellect, before the intelligible form has been separated from the 
material substrate in intellect in habitus.  
      Themistius (317–c. 387) made use of Alexander’s De anima in his com-
mentary on the De anima of Aristotle. While in the thought of Alexander 
thought and perception are intimately connected, almost identical, Themisti-
us goes to much greater length to differentiate the two. Sense perception 
must be distinguished from reasoning, and there are many varieties of the 
capacity for reasoning. In contrasting sense perception and reason, Themisti-
us does not distinguish between the types of reason as established in the Ar-
istotelian tradition: intellect (nous), thinking (noêsis), capacity for reasoning 
(logikê dunamis), and discursive thinking (dianoia). Thinking is divided into 
the capacity for imagination and the capacity for judgment, and the two are 
clearly distinguished, as belief and assent play no role in imagination. Imag-
ination (phantasia) is that part of thinking which is most closely related to 
sense perception, because imagination depends on the reception of the sensi-
ble image, and the retention of the image in thought, the mnemic residue. 
Imagination is a necessary precondition for intellect, but the two must still be 
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distinguished. Imagination is the process in which an image or phantasma 
“comes to exist in us” (Themistius, De anima 89)5 as an imprint or tupos and 
“form of the sense-impression” or aisthêma in the soul. It is concluded from 
this that imagination is a capacity or hexeis of the soul for discernment, ex-
cluding the faculties of belief or assent. Imagination must be a faculty for 
discernment for Themistius because the phantasma must be in part a product 
of thought and not just a pure imprint of the sensible object; it must be an in-
telligible, not just a sensible.  
      According to Themistius, sense perception must be distinguished from 
imagination because imagination occurs in sleep while sense perception does 
not. Imagination thus requires an unconscious thought activity, something 
other than discursive reason, but not self-conscious, an element of noesis as a 
product of active intellect, intellect from without. While sense perception is 
both potential and actual, like material intellect, both tied to the sensible ob-
ject and incorporeal, potential sense perception, the engagement with the 
sensible, corporeal object, does not occur in dreams. Dreams only consist of 
the residues of sense perception, the mnemic residues of the traces of the im-
prints, or enkataleimmata, involving the intelligible as a product of active 
intellect. Themistius points out that it is difficult to distinguish between the 
activity of perception and the activity of imagination in relation to the sense 
object as it is perceived, that is, between the sensible and intelligible form, 
and the activities of discursive reason and nous.  
      Such a distinction would require a consciousness of the influence of ac-
tive intellect, and a self-consciousness of reason in perception. Imagination 
is active while sense perception focuses on the object; sense perception acts 
on the sensible object as imagination acts on sense perception. The imprint is 
formed as sensible and intelligible simultaneously, but the intelligible en-
dures in memoria while the sensible does not. In the De anima of Themisti-
us, the relation between the object of sense perception and sense perception 
is the same as the relation between sense perception and imagination in part 
because both require the imprinting of the eidos, the former being the sensi-
ble, the latter being the intelligible. The enfolding of the phantasia in materi-
al intellect constitutes the process of actualization or entelechy of the 
material intellect to active intellect, in the perfection of the imagination 
through sense perception: imagination is “perfected by progressing to actual-
ity through the agency of sense perception, just as sense perception is 
through the agency of the objects of perception.”             
      The material intellect for Themistius cannot be identical to the objects 
6 
 
that it thinks; it must remain potentially all things, which differentiates it 
from actual intellect, through the influence of productive intellect, which be-
comes identical to the objects that it thinks. The material intellect is “none of 
the objects that exist prior to its thinking” (Themistius, De anima 94), and is 
thus not real or actual, but potential. Intellect as both material and actual can 
be compared to a line which is both bent and straight, one line in two differ-
ent states. Potential intellect is something (to tode), according to Themistius, 
as matter is something, while actual intellect is “what it is to be something” 
(to tôide einai; Themistius, De anima 100), as the sensible object as form in 
the soul is what it is to be something. In the same way, the thinking subject 
as potential intellect is “I” (to egô), while the thinking subject as actual intel-
lect is “what it is to be me” (to emoi einai). The thinking subject is the “intel-
lect combined from the potential to the actual,” in becoming, in discursive, 
conscious thought, while “what it is to be me” comes from actual intellect, in 
producing, in intellection, which involves unconscious thought. The poten-
tial thinking subject and the actual thinking subject are distinct. The actual 
thinking subject is the product of productive intellect, which is made possi-
ble by potential intellect, which is made possible by the imagination, which 
is made possible by perception. Perception, imagination, and potential intel-
lect together can only allow for the potential thinking subject; productive in-
tellect, as distinct from what makes it possible, alone allows for the actual 
thinking subject. Productive intellect alone is a “form of forms,” an incorpo-
real intelligible, while perception, imagination and potential intellect are tied 
to the corporeal and are only substrates, as matter is only a substrate for the 
form of a sensible object. 
      The thought of the material intellect, in discursive reason, is subject to 
time, while the thought of productive intellect, actual intellect given by ac-
tive intellect, is not, as Themistius explains in De anima 101. In the De ani-
ma of Aristotle, “in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to 
actual knowledge” (3.5.430a), subject to time, but outside the individual po-
tential intellect, there is no temporal relation between potential and actual 
intellect. Actual intellect is “mind set free from its present condi-
tions…immortal and eternal,” incorporeal. Mind as passive, in its material 
potentiality, is destructible and subject to time, as in the ephemerality of the 
phantasmata, but mind as active is free from its material conditions; the in-
telligible is permanent and not subject to temporal duration. Discursive 
thinking is equivalent to thinking in time; time is not present in the same 
way in unconscious thought or dreams.  
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      When intellect thinks an object in matter, intellect and object are dis-
tinct, according to Themistius (Themistius, De anima 97), but when intellect 
thinks the immaterial object, the intelligible, as it has become an intelligible 
through the illumination of the productive intellect, “what thinks and what is 
being thought are identical.” The same would be said for vision: when the 
perceiver sees the enmattered object, perception and object are distinct, but 
when the perceiver sees the intelligible form in the mind’s eye, illuminated 
by the productive intellect as an intelligible, what sees and what is seen are 
identical, as what is seen is the product of what sees unconsciously.  
      In the Risala fi’l-‘aql of Abu Nasr Alfarabi (c. 872–951),6 also known as 
De intellectu, or Letter Concerning the Intellect, actualized intelligible be-
comes an object of thought in discursive reason, in actualized intellect; it be-
comes a concrete form of the abstract. The actualized intelligible is the 
articulation of the intellectual insight, which can be counted and included in 
a totality, as Alfarabi says in the Risala, “when [the intelligibles] become in-
telligibles in actuality, they become, then, one of the things existing in the 
world, and they are counted, insofar as they are intelligibles, among the to-
tality of existing things” (Hyman, p. 216). The actualized intelligibles lead 
discursive reason back to the intelligibles themselves, which are their source, 
while the sensible leads discursive reason back to its source, the intelligible. 
In the Risala, when the actualized intelligible becomes the object of the 
thought of the actualized intellect, the actualized intelligible and the actual-
ized intellect are identical, as “that which is thought is then nothing but that 
which is in actuality an intellect” (Hyman, p. 216). The intellect in actuality 
is only so in relation to the form of the actualized intelligible; the intellect 
remains potential in relation to other intelligibles which are still potential, in 
the material, and have not become actual. When intellect becomes actual in 
relation to all intelligibles, and intellect becomes the actualized intelligibles 
themselves, then the object of the thought of intellect, the actualized intelli-
gibles, is intellect itself: “when it thinks that existent thing which is an intel-
lect in actuality, it does not think an existing thing outside of itself but it only 
thinks itself,” in unconscious thought. 
      According to Alfarabi, “when the intellect in actuality thinks the intelli-
gibles which are forms in it, insofar as they are intelligibles in actuality, then 
the intellect of which it was first said that it is the intellect in actuality, be-
comes now the acquired intellect,” the third of the Aristotelian senses, intel-
lectus adeptus or nous epiktetos. For the acquired or actualized intellect 
which thinks itself as an intelligible, “the statement ‘that which belongs to us 
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in actuality as an intellect’ and ‘that which is in us in actuality as an intellect’ 
is the very same statement,” in relation to “those forms which are not in mat-
ters and which never were in them,” according to Alfarabi (Hyman, p. 217). 
That which we perceive and think is our own intellect, which constitutes the 
forms which define matter. But intellect as the object of its own thought is 
inaccessible to conscious reason.  
      For Alfarabi, intellect ascends from the material to the agent intellect as 
it ascends from the particular to the eternal, from the multiplicity of divisions 
to the unity and simplicity of that which is indivisible. In the ascent to agent 
intellect, we ascend “to the things which are more perfect in existence,” and 
we ascend “from that which is best known to us to that which is unknown” 
(Risala, Hyman, p. 219), in the unconscious. The knowledge of things which 
are most accessible to intellect is the lowest form of knowledge; in order to 
develop, intellect must come to grasp the knowledge which is least accessi-
ble and most unconscious.       
      In the Liber Naturalis (al-Tabi’iyyat) of Avicenna or Ibn Sīnā (c. 980–
1037), the potential knowing of the material intellect is actualized when in-
telligibles are projected onto it from the purely intellectual and incorporeal, 
which is the active intellect, which is capable of abstracting intelligible 
forms. According to Avicenna, “the cause for giving intelligible form is 
nothing but the active intellect, in whose power are the principles of abstract 
intelligible forms” (6.5.5).7 Cogitative knowledge is different from 
knowledge of principles or intelligibles, which requires the participation of 
active intellect in actual intellect. Cogitative reason is necessary to ascend 
from material intellect to actual intellect, involving the stage which is called 
intellectus in habitu, habitual intellect. Intellectus in habitu is described as an 
intellect as a state, nous kath hexin, a state of preparedness for intellect. 
      Intellectus in habitu is an intellect in act, intellectus in effectu, though not 
in constant act, only when turned towards active intellect. Intellectus in 
habitu operates according to principles or first intelligibles, in the participa-
tion of active intellect, when the intelligible is present in it, as reflected, il-
luminated or emanated by active intellect, in an acquired intellect, an 
intellectus accommodatus, or an intellect acquired from outside human intel-
lect, accommodatus ab extrinsecus. The intellectus in habitu leads to an ac-
tualized intellect, which is able to separate itself from the corporeals of sense 
perception and the mechanisms of material intellect. In the Liber Naturalis, 
“Thus the rational soul, being in a certain kind of union with the forms, is 
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capable of having present in it free from all admixture the forms that come 
from the light of the active intellect itself” (6.5.5). 
      Active intellect and material intellect are mediated by the intellect which 
is both active and potential, intellectus in habitu, which is a state of prepar-
edness for intellection in the participation of active intellect. It is a precondi-
tion for knowledge of both sensibles and intelligibles in material intellect, in 
the connection between the soul and the corporeal. Once the soul is separat-
ed from the corporeal, it no longer requires the preparatory sensory potencies 
assimilated in the sensus communis, and is capable of union with the active 
intellect, insofar as it can receive the participation of active intellect. “But 
when the soul is once freed from body and from the accidents of body, it will 
be capable of union with the active intellect, and in this intellect it shall find 
intelligible beauty and eternal delight” (Liber Naturalis 6.5.6).  
      Material intellect is present in human intellect from birth, according to 
Avicenna. Material intellect then progresses to the stage of intellectus in 
habitu, then to actualized intellect, in which it can be participated in by ac-
tive intellect. Intellectus in habitu is capable of operating according to prin-
ciples, principia conoscendi, while actual intellect is capable of operating 
according to intelligibles. Both the principia conoscendi and the intelligibles 
come from without, from active intellect; they are not properties inherent to 
material intellect. The memory of the principle or intelligible is not an actual 
memory, as principles and intelligibles are incorporeal, so a trace of them 
cannot be retained. A memory of an intelligible is actually the memory of the 
knowledge of the intelligible, not the intelligible itself, as it is reflected onto 
the oculus mentis in the illumination of the active intellect. Human intellect 
cannot possess the intelligible or the trace of the intelligible; it can only pos-
sess the knowledge or awareness of the intelligible, in its heightened state of 
functioning as material intellect in intellectus in habitu or actualized intel-
lect. Conscious thought can only be aware of the presence of unconscious 
thought. 
      The immediate sensible perception can have no permanence until it has 
been transformed by the agent intellect into a universal, and processed in in-
corporeal intellection. The sensible form is then received by the soul and be-
comes the material of the acquired or obtained cognition, intellectus adeptus 
or intellectus accommodatus, and actual cognition is possible. The acquired 
cognition is the acquired intellect, nous epiktetos, but is not the same as the 
intellectus in habitu, which is discursive reason as distinct from agent intel-
lect. In relation to Aristotle’s doctrine of passive and active intellect, the ac-
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tive intellect becomes the foundation for intellection, as mediated by the in-
tellectus in habitu in combination with the intellectus adeptus.  
      Sense objects of themselves are subject to the fluctuating and imperma-
nent collection of unrelated particulars that constitute the material world. 
The same is true of the sensible form in the phantasia, as long as it is con-
nected to the corporeity of the sensus communis and the phantasia in cogita-
tive reason. As the sensible form is processed as the intelligible form and 
stored in imaginatio as phantasmata and in memoria as intentiones, the 
mnemic residues can be retained by cogitative reason and vis aestimativa to 
varying degrees, to the extent of the participation of active intellect, so that 
intellect is seen as a kind of palimpsest of traces of forms and thoughts of 
varying clarity in relation to cognition, conscious thought.  
      Unconscious thought might be seen as the intelligible in cognition in the 
Aristotelian model, as connected to sense perception, only accessible to con-
scious thought or actual intellect to varying degrees; unconscious thought 
would be seen as thought participating in something outside itself, the arche-
typal intelligible which is the product of the illumination of active intellect. 
For Aristotle, as can be seen in the third book of De anima, thought partici-
pates in something external to itself, the active intellect. Full access to intel-
ligibles as illuminated by the active intellect is only possible for Avicenna 
when the soul is released from the body in a state of beatitude, when intellec-
tion is detached from sense perception, though such detachment is possible 
to varying degrees in the actualization of intellect, though only at various 
moments, subject to the temporal and spatial limitations of the human soul 
and conscious reason.  
      The active intellect of Averroes or Ibn Rushd (1126–98) can be seen as a 
form of unconscious thought. In his Long Commentary on the De anima, 
material intellect, in that it is only a possibility, contains neither actual intel-
lectual cognition nor a faculty for intellectual cognition. Both of these are 
only possible in actualized intellect, through intellectus speculativus, ac-
quired intellect, and the affect of agent or active intellect. Material intellect 
contains only the possibility of being united with active intellect; all material 
intellects are equally potential. The phantasm in imagination is corporeal, 
and potentially intelligible, as the material intellect has the potential to un-
derstand the intelligible. The sensible form can only potentially be an intelli-
gible form if it is predetermined by the intelligible form. In the De anima 
3.5.36,8 “this sort of action,” of the active intellect, “which consists in gener-
ating intelligibles and actualizing them, exists in us prior to the action of the 
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intellect,” prior to the formation of the perceived form in imaginatio, in the 
unconscious, as it were.  
      In the De anima 3.1.7,9 “the cogitative faculty,” virtus cogitativa, “be-
longs to the genus of sensible faculties. But the imaginative and the cogita-
tive and the recollective” faculties, imaginatio, ratio and memoria, “all 
cooperate in producing the image of the sensible thing,” the species sensi-
bilis, “so that the separate rational faculty can perceive it,” as a reflected im-
age in the oculus mentis, “and extract the universal intention,” the 
intelligible, “and finally receive, i.e., comprehend it.” In the words of Franz 
Brentano, “Once they have done this, and once the activity of the active in-
tellect has made the images intelligible in unconscious thought, the material 
intellect, which stands to all intelligible forms in the relation of potentiality, 
receives from the images the concepts of sensible things.” 
      The material intellect, virtus cogitativa, in that it is tied to the particulars 
of sense perception, is a singular entity in each individual, and cannot pro-
duce meaning or communication, cannot unite the cognitive faculties of each 
individual. The active intellect, on the other hand, in that it is capable of 
formulating intelligibles, which are incorporeal and not tied to the materials 
of individual sense perception, is able to unite particular individuals engag-
ing in cognition in order to create a shared intellection which produces 
communication and meaning. This is sometimes referred to as “monopsy-
chism.” In De anima 3.1.5,10 “And since it has already been shown that the 
intellect cannot unite with all individuals by multiplying according to their 
number with respect to that part that is the opposite of intellect qua form,” 
material intellect, “the only thing that remains is that this intellect unites with 
all of us through the union with us of concepts or intentions present to the 
mind…”. It is thus a “collective unconscious.” While the operation of the 
virtus cogitativa is particular to each individual, the intelligible form, which 
it receives from the active intellect, is universal and shared by every individ-
ual, as it is retained as a permanent archetype in intellection.       
      When the intelligible is received by the material intellect, it is subject to 
generation and corruption, multiplicity and accident. The intelligible form, 
when it is connected to the sensible form in material intellect, is not a per-
manent mnemic residue as an archetype, but is fluctuating and impermanent 
in its corporeal manifestation. But the intelligible form does not disappear 
when its corresponding sensible form does, it merely ceases to participate in 
the sensible form. As Aristotle said, “Mind does not think intermittently” 
(De anima 430a10–25). Mind is always thinking, consciously and uncon-
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sciously. In the De anima of Averroes, 3.1.5,11 “And if intelligibles of this 
kind are considered, insofar as they have being simpliciter and not in respect 
of some individual,” as universals, “then it must truly be said of them that 
they have eternal being, and that they are not sometimes intelligibles and 
sometimes not, but that they always exist in the same manner…”. The intel-
ligible form can participate in the sensible form, of its own volition, or the 
volition of the active intellect, but the sensible form cannot participate in the 
intelligible form, in its corporeal limitations.             
      The material intellect of every individual is capable of receiving the in-
telligible form; individual material intellects receive intelligibles from the 
unconscious active intellect to varying degrees, depending on the extent to 
which the individual aspires to intelligible knowledge. It is not that the mate-
rial intellect is not always thinking and does not always have the potential to 
receive intelligibles, it is just that it is not always united with active intellect. 
It is through the perfected union between the material intellect and the active 
intellect that intelligibles are apprehended, and that a beatific state can be 
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